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BOB PANKAKE, in his capacity as zoning officer 
for Pine Grove Township 
 
       Zoning Hearing Board of Pine Grove 
       Township, Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania 
       and Bob Pankake, 
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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
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Argued April 29, 1999 
 
Before: SCIRICA, ROTH and McKAY,* 
Circuit Judges 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case brought under the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, P.L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 and 47 U.S.C.), the issue is whether the 
District Court properly found that the denial of a special 
exception under the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning 
Code, Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 53, S 10909.1(6) (West 1997), to 
build a tower for transmission of wireless telephone signals 
was not supported by substantial evidence as required by 
the Telecommunications Act S 704(a), 47 U.S.C.A. 
S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1999). We will affirm. 
 
I 
 
On June 30, 1997, Omnipoint, a major wireless 
telephone service provider,1 applied to the Zoning Hearing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "Although often called `cellular' telephone service, several different 
technologies compete. Omnipoint uses a high frequency, digital system 
called personal communication service, or `PCS.' Almost all systems 
employ hand-held telephone sets communicating by radio with antennas 
strategically located on towers or buildings; each antenna is connected 
eventually to the land-line telephone network." Town of Amherst, N.H. v. 
Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
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Board of Pine Grove Township in Schuylkill County, 
Pennsylvania for a special exception permitting Omnipoint 
to build a 114-foot monopole2 on property located in a 
sparsely populated, mountainous region of the township. 
The Board held hearings on Omnipoint's application on 
August 14, 1997 and September 11, 1997. At the hearings, 
Omnipoint was represented by Lee Woodmansee of JM 
Consulting Group, who testified the proposed site"is 
surrounded by large 80, 90 foot trees, in my estimation" 
and therefore that the monopole would "probably" be visible 
only to neighbors more than 600 feet away. Woodmansee 
estimated that the nearest neighbor's residence was 500 
feet from the proposed site. Although Woodmansee believed 
there were studies generally showing no adverse effect of 
towers such as the proposed monopole on the values of 
adjoining properties, JM Consulting had conducted no 
study in this instance. Several local residents questioned 
Woodmansee about the visibility of the tower, its effects on 
property values, and especially health threats associated 
with its radio emissions. David Ravegun, a neighboring 
property owner, testified that he estimated the trees in the 
area to be approximately 60 feet in height. As a result, he 
believed the tower would be visible from his property, 
especially in winter, and therefore would hurt his property 
value. He also testified, allegedly on the basis of a classified 
report to which he had access, that the tower's high 
intensity radio transmissions would be harmful to 
neighbors' health. Ten other neighboring property owners 
represented they would offer testimony substantially similar 
to Ravegun's. 
 
On October 21, 1997, the Board denied Omnipoint's 
requested exception because "a) no studies were done on 
the effect of adjoining land owners [sic] property values; b) 
the burden of proof with respect to the proposed structure 
not adversely effecting [sic] the general character of the 
neighborhood was not met." Omnipoint then brought this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A monopole is a telecommunications tower used to transmit wireless 
telephone signals. Ordinarily, Omnipoint, like other wireless telephone 
providers, sites its transmitters on existing structures. In such 
locations, 
the transmitters are almost invisible. Where no suitable pre-existing 
structures are available, a tower is built. 
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action alleging the Board's denial of the special exception 
violated the Telecommunications Act. The parties agreed to 
a non-jury trial based on a written record that included an 
extensive stipulation of undisputed facts. On September 16, 
1998, the District Court found the Board's decision had not 
been based on substantial evidence because, first, the 
evidence before the Board did not establish the detrimental 
effect of the proposed tower with a "high degree of 
probability" as required by Pennsylvania law; and second, 
the decision was based on aesthetic considerations and a 
desire to preserve property values, factors the District Court 
held cannot justify denial of a special exception under 
Pennsylvania law. Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 
20 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878-80 (E.D. Pa. 1998). The District 
Court ordered the Board to issue the special exception, see 
id. at 881-82, and the Board now appeals. 
 
II 
 
Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act3 "to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 S 704(a), 47 U.S.C.A. S 332(c)(7) 
provides in relevant part, 
 
       (A) General Authority 
 
        Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter 
       shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government 
or 
       instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, 
       construction, and modification of personal wireless service 
facilities. 
 
       (B) Limitations 
 
        (i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and 
modification 
       of personal wireless service facilities by any State or local 
       government or instrumentality thereof-- 
 
       (I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of 
       functionally equivalent services; and 
 
       (II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the 
       provision of personal wireless services. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (iii) Any decision by a State or local government or 
instrumentality 
       thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal 
                                 4 
  
provide for a pro competitive, de-regulatory national policy 
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private-sector 
deployment of advanced telecommunications and 
information technologies and services to all Americans by 
opening all telecommunications markets to competition 
. . . ." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted 
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 124. Among the 
telecommunications technologies addressed was wireless 
telephone service. Congress found that "siting and zoning 
decisions by non-federal units of government[ ] have created 
an inconsistent and, at times, conflicting patchwork of 
requirements which will inhibit the deployment of Personal 
Communications Services as well as the rebuilding of a 
digital technology-based cellular telecommunications 
network." H.R. Rep. 104-204, at 94 (1995), reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61. But Congress also "recognize[d] 
that there are legitimate State and local concerns involved 
in regulating the siting of such facilities . . ., such as 
aesthetic values and the costs associated with the use and 
maintenance of public rights-of-way." Id. at 94-95, reprinted 
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 61. The House version of the Act 
would have required the FCC to regulate the siting of 
wireless telephone transmitters, but the Conference 
Committee instead enacted S 332(c)(7) to "preserve the 
authority of State and local governments over zoning and 
land use matters except in . . . limited circumstances . . . ." 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 207-08, reprinted in 1996 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by 
       substantial evidence contained in a written record. 
 
       (iv) No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may 
       regulate the placement, construction, and modification of personal 
       wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental 
effects of 
       radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply 
       with the [FCC]'s regulations concerning such emissions. 
 
       (v) Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to 
       act by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof 
       that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may, within thirty days 
       after such action or failure to act, commence an action in any 
court 
       of competent jurisdiction. The court shall hear and decide such 
       action on an expedited basis. 
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U.S.C.C.A.N. at 222. As the First Circuit noted, section 
332(c)(7) "is a deliberate compromise between two 
competing aims--to facilitate nationally the growth of 
wireless telephone service and to maintain substantial local 
control over siting of towers." Town of Amherst, N.H. v. 
Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 13 (1st 
Cir. 1999). 
 
Subsection 332(c)(7) provides for local regulation of the 
placement of wireless telephone transmission equipment, 
with certain statutory limitations: Local zoning authorities 
may not discriminate among providers of wireless telephone 
service, see S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), act in a manner that 
effectively prohibits the provision of wireless telephone 
services, see S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), or make zoning decisions 
based on concerns over the environmental or health effects 
of the radio emissions associated with wireless telephone 
service, see S 332(c)(7)(B)(iv); Cellular Telephone Co. v. Town 
of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1999). In 
addition, a zoning board's decision to deny permission to 
build a wireless service facility must be "in writing and 
supported by substantial evidence contained in a written 
record." S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). If a zoning board violates these 
statutory requirements, S 332(c)(7)(B)(v) gives the adversely 
affected party a cause of action, which is to be decided "on 
an expedited basis." 
 
Omnipoint has brought this suit under S 332(c)(7)(B)(v), 
maintaining that the Board's decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence as required by S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). The 
District Court had original federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C.A. S 1331 (West 1993). We have appellate 
jurisdiction over the District Court's final order under 28 
U.S.C.A. S 1291 (West 1993). 
 
III 
 
Because "substantial evidence" is a legal term of art, we 
presume Congress intended to adopt the term's ordinary 
legal meaning. See McDermott Intern., Inc. v. Wilander, 498 
U.S. 337, 342 (1991). Here, the Conference Committee 
confirmed that it intended the courts to review zoning 
decisions under the same standard applied to federal 
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administrative decisions. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, 
at 208, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 223. Substantial 
evidence is not "a large or considerable amount of evidence, 
but rather `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' " Pierce 
v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 
(1938)). In determining whether the evidence before an 
agency was substantial, a court views the record in its 
entirety and takes account of evidence unfavorable to the 
agency's decision. See American Textile Mfr. Inst., Inc. v. 
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981). We apply the same 
standard as the District Court. See Adorno v. Shalala, 40 
F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994) (review of disability benefit 
decisions under 42 U.S.C. S 405(g)). 
 
Subject to the substantive limitations described supra, 
"[t]he substantial evidence test applies to the locality's own 
zoning requirements." Amherst v. Omnipoint, 173 F.3d at 
16. The Board contends the special exception was denied 
for aesthetic reasons and to protect the values of 
neighboring properties. Such considerations are sufficient 
to support the denial of a special exception under 
Pennsylvania law4 and are consistent with Congress' intent 
to allow localities to accommodate traditional zoning 
considerations in siting wireless telephone transmitters. 
The question, therefore, is whether the Board had before it 
substantial evidence that the proposed special exception 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code authorizes local zoning 
ordinances to specify the standards governing requests for special 
exceptions. See Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 53,S 10912.1 (West 1997). Aesthetics 
and concern for property values may be included in these standards. See 
Berk v. Wilkinsburg Zoning Hearing Bd., 410 A.2d 904, 905-06 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1980). Pine Grove Township Zoning Ordinance S 902(3)(c) 
requires that a proposed exception "not adversely affect the character of 
the general neighborhood, nor the conservation of property values, nor 
the health and safety of residents or workers on adjacent properties and 
in the general neighborhood, nor the reasonable use of neighboring 
properties. The use of adjacent properties shall be adequately 
safeguarded." This language encompasses the grounds on which the 
Board defends its decision. 
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would cause deterioration to the aesthetic character of the 
area or to neighboring property values.5  
 
The Board relies heavily on AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. 
City Council, 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998), where the court 
affirmed the city council's denial of a conditional use permit 
to build two 135-foot wireless telephone transmission 
towers based on considerable community opposition. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stressed the 
legislative nature of the city council: 
 
        The Virginia Beach City Council is a state legislative 
       body, not a federal administrative agency. . . . It is not 
       only proper but even expected that a legislature and its 
       members will consider the views of their constituents 
       to be particularly compelling forms of evidence, in 
       zoning as in all other legislative matters. These views, 
       if widely shared, will often trump those of bureaucrats 
       or experts in the minds of reasonable legislators. 
 
Id. at 430. On the other hand, the Court Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit characterized zoning permit decisions as 
primarily administrative in nature: 
 
       [T]rue as the AT & T Wireless observation may be 
       about legislators, it overlooks the fact that municipal 
       councils often wear several hats when they act. When 
       they are passing ordinances or other laws, they are 
       without a doubt legislators, but when they sit as an 
       administrative body making decisions about zoning 
       permits, they are like any other agency the state has 
       created. We therefore apply the conventional 
       substantial evidence standard to the case before us. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Omnipoint argues that opponents of the exception did not meet the 
evidentiary burden required by Pennsylvania law. But we agree with the 
Board that the Telecommunications Act does not authorize general 
appeals in federal court of state zoning decisions. The question before us 
is whether the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence-- 
the evidentiary burden specified in the Telecommunications Act. See 
Aegerter v. City of Delafied, 174 F.3d 886, ___, 1999 WL 225310, at *2- 
*4 (7th Cir. 1999); Cellular Telephone, 166 F.3d at 494-97 (both applying 
the substantial evidence requirement of S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) without regard 
to state law evidentiary burdens). 
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Aegerter v. City of Delafied, 174 F.3d 886, ___, 1999 WL 
225310, at *3 (7th Cir. 1999). The Zoning Hearing Board of 
Pine Grove Township described itself as a "quasi-judicial 
body" in the Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts. Under 
Pennsylvania law, "[t]he zoning board has a dual role, 
partly legislative and partly quasi-judicial." Urbano v. 
Meneses, 431 A.2d 308, 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). The Urbano court 
summarized with approval decisions in other states holding 
that "zoning boards are acting in a quasi-judicial function 
when they rule upon an application for a zoning permit for 
a particular piece of property . . . ." Id. ; see also Norate 
Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 207 A.2d 890, 893 (Pa. 
1965) (referring to a zoning board as "a quasi-judicial 
body"); Hill v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 597 A.2d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1991) (describing zoning boards as 
administrative in nature); Huebner v. Phila. Sav. Fund 
Soc'y, 192 A. 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937) (same). 
Because the Zoning Hearing Board acted in a quasi-judicial 
capacity when it denied Omnipoint's application, we apply 
the substantial evidence standard as we would to the 
decision of a federal administrative body. 
 
In AT&T Wireless, "numerous area residents" spoke 
against the permit application and the council received 
petitions, also in opposition, bearing almost 800 signatures. 
155 F.3d at 425. The protestants argued primarily that two 
135-foot towers would be "eyesores" if erected in "a heavily 
wooded residential neighborhood with no significant 
commercial development, no commercial antenna towers, 
and no above-ground power lines." Id. at 425, 424. Here, 
the District Court found that "any claims asserted by 
protestants were at best very general and speculative[,]" 
Omnipoint v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 880, 
and we agree. Eleven neighbors asserted that the monopole 
would be visible over the tree line and would damage their 
property values. But Ravegun, who spoke for all eleven 
neighbors, addressed the visibility of the tower only briefly 
and presented no evidence regarding property values. 
Ravegun's comments and the questions that he and other 
residents asked of Woodmansee focused more on alleged 
health effects, which the Board may not consider under 
S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), than on aesthetic considerations or 
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property values. As the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held, a "few generalized expressions of concern with 
`aesthetics' cannot serve as substantial evidence" for 
purposes of S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) and, similarly, "[a] few 
generalized concerns about a potential decrease in property 
values, especially in light of [the plaintiff]'s contradictory 
expert testimony, does not seem adequate to support a 
conclusion that the permits should be denied." Cellular 
Telephone, 166 F.3d at 496 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Because the Board's denial of the exception was not 
based on substantial evidence, the District Court properly 
ruled that the Board's decision violated the 
Telecommunications Act. 
 
IV 
 
The Board also contends that the District Court should 
have remanded the case to the Zoning Hearing Board 
rather than ordering the exception issued. We generally 
review a district court's choice of equitable remedy for 
abuse of discretion, provided the remedy ordered is 
permitted by the governing law. See Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil, 
Co., 987 F.2d 939, 943 (3d Cir. 1993); Voest-Alpine Trading 
USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 919 F.2d 206, 211 (3d 
Cir. 1990). Injunctions are proper forms of relief under 
S 332(c)(7)(B)(v), see Cellular Telephone, 166 F.3d at 497, 
and the Board has not suggested any purpose that would 
be served by remand. We see no abuse of discretion here. 
Cf. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 43-44 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(refusing Secretary of Health and Human Services' request 
for a remand to allow further development of the record 
after a finding that the Secretary's decision had not been 
supported by substantial evidence, in part because"there is 
no good cause for the Secretary's failure to adduce all the 
relevant evidence in the prior proceeding"). 
 
V 
 
For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment. 
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